Security of quantum key distribution using a simplified trusted relay

William Stacey, Razieh Annabestani, Xiongfeng Ma, and Norbert Lütkenhaus
Phys. Rev. A 91, 012338 – Published 28 January 2015

Abstract

We propose a QKD protocol for trusted node relays. Our protocol shifts the communication and computational weight of classical postprocessing to the end users by reassigning the roles of error correction and privacy amplification, while leaving the exchange of quantum signals untouched. We perform a security analysis for this protocol based on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol on the level of infinite key formulas, taking into account weak coherent implementations involving decoy analysis.

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  • Received 27 August 2014

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.91.012338

©2015 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

William Stacey1, Razieh Annabestani1, Xiongfeng Ma2, and Norbert Lütkenhaus1

  • 1Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1
  • 2Center for Quantum Information, Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

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Vol. 91, Iss. 1 — January 2015

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