Skip to main content
Log in

Was the bell system a natural monopoly? An application of data envelopment analysis

  • Published:
Annals of Operations Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Examination of the relation between scale economies and natural monopoly has been a central issue in public policy research. The paper employs Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology to re-examine the issue of natural monopoly for the Bell system with annual time series data for 1947--1977. Results from the DEA-based statistical tests reveal the prevalence of increasing returns to scale for the Bell system, implying that there were economies of scale for the Bell system. This evidence suggests that the Bell data was indeed consistent with a natural monopoly. Further, the results indicate that the low level of overall efficiency primarily results from allocative inefficiency rather than technical and scale inefficiency.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Banker, R.D. (1984). “Estimating Most Productive Scale Size Using Data Envelopment Analysis.” European Journal of Operations Research, 17, 35–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Banker, R.D. (1993). “Maximum Likelihood, Consistency and Data Envelopment Analysis: A Statistical Foundation.” Management Science, 39, 1265–1273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banker, R.D. and H. Chang. (1995). “A Simulation Study of Hypothesis Tests for Differences in Efficiencies.” International Journal of Production Economics, 39, 37–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banker, R.D. and H. Chang. (2002). “Tests of Returns to Scale for Monotone Concave Production Function.” The University of Texas at Dallas, Working Paper.

  • Banker, R.D., A. Charnes, and WW. Cooper. (1984). “Models for the Estimation of Technical and Scale Inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis.” Management Science, 30, 1078–1092.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banker, R.D. and A. Maindiratta. (1988). “Nonparametric Analysis of Technical and Allocative Efficiencies in Production.” Econometrica, 56, 1315–1332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cave, M., S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang. (2002). “Structure, Regulation and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry.” In M. Cave, S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science BV.

  • Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes. (1981). “Program Evaluation and Managerial Efficiency: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis to Program Follow Through.” Management Science, 27, 668–697.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper, and A.P. Schinnar. (1982). “Transforms and Approximation in Cost and Production Function Relations.” Omega-International Journal of Management Science, 10, 207–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper, and T. Sueyoshi. (1988). “A Goal Programming/Constrained Regression Review of The Bell System Break Up.” Management Science, 34, 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D. and J. Heckman. (1983). “Multiproduct Cost Function Estimates and Natural Monopoly Tests for The Bell System.” In D. Evans (ed.), Breaking up Bell: Essays on Industrial Organization and Regulation, New York, North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D. and J. Heckman. (1984). “A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to the Bell System.” American Economic Review September, 615–623.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, D. and J. Heckman. (1988). “Natural Monopoly and the Bell System: Response to Charnes, Cooper and Sueyoshi.” Management Science, 34, 27–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gold, B. (1981). “Changing Perspectives on Size, Scale and Returns: An Interpretive Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature, 19, 5–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenwald, B.C. and W.W. Sharkey. (1989). “The Economics of Deregulation of Local Exchange Telecommunications.” Bellcore Economics Discussion Paper #56.

  • Littlechild, S.C. (1979). Elements of Telecommunications Economics. Peter Peregrinus, Ltd, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Majumdar, S. (1998). “On the Utilization of Resources: Perspectives from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry.” Strategic Management Journal, 19, 809–831.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Majumdar, S. and H. Chang. (1996). “Scale Efficiencies in U.S. Telecommunications: An Empirical Investigation.” Managerial and Decision Economics, 17, 303–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Majumdar, S. and H. Chang. (1998). “Optimal Local Exchange Carrier Size.” Review of Industrial Organization 13, 637–649.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roller, L.-H. (1990). “Proper Quadratic Cost Functions with an Application to The Bell System.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 72, 202–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shephard, R.W. (1970). The Theory of Cost and Production Functions. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Waverman, L. (1989). “U.S. Inter-exchange Competition.” In R. Crandall and K. Flamm (eds.), Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition and Regulation in Commnications. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hsihui Chang.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Chang, H., Mashruwala, R. Was the bell system a natural monopoly? An application of data envelopment analysis. Ann Oper Res 145, 251–263 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-006-0033-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-006-0033-8

Keywords

Navigation