Prabhakar Raghavan
ABSTRACT
We propose a notion of incentive networks, modeling online settings in which multiple participants in a network help each other find information. Within this general setting, we study query incentive networks, a natural abstraction of question-answering systems with rewards for finding answers. We analyze strategic behavior in such networks and under a simple model of networks, show that the Nash equilibrium for participants' strategies exhibits an unexpected threshold phenomenon.
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