Abstract
The ideas of singular term and of general term in predicative position play a central part in Quine’s theory of canonical notation. I examine two attempts to explain these ideas, and I argue that they rest upon certain other notions whose role as foundations is not clearly acknowledged in Quine’s explanations.
Reprinted, with the permission of the Editors and of the Author, from The Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961) 393–412.
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References
Word and Object, published by the Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1960. Page references are given in parentheses. Italics are mine, except where otherwise indicated.
Only sometimes ‘he’ and ‘it’, for these may function like bound variables of quantification and then are to be distinguished from definite singular terms; only sometimes ‘a lion’, for nouns preceded by an indefinite article often appear in purely predicative position and then are not singular terms at all. Indeed, these qualifications are still insufficient; for not only ‘he’ and ‘it’, but ‘the lion’ and ‘that lion’, too, may function like bound variables of quantification, as in such a sentence as ‘If you tweak a lion’s tail, the (that) lion will resent it’.
Quine’s italics.
A full account of the matter would call for much more detail and many qualifications. I cannot claim to be doing more than drawing attention to a characteristic difference of function between definite singular terms and general terms in predicative position, in cases where both terms alike may fairly be said to be applied to a single concrete object. Thus it would not be true to say that the use of a definite singular term for a particular is always designed to draw upon resources of identifying knowledge or presumption antecedently in possession of the audience. For sometimes the operations of supplying such resources and of drawing on them may be conflated in the use of a singular term. Nor would it be true to say the general term is never used, whereas the singular term is always used, for the purpose of indicating to the audience which object it is that the other term is being applied to. For it is easy to think of cases in which, as one would be inclined to say, the roles are reversed. But counter-examples to a universal thesis about differences of function are not necessarily counter-examples to a thesis about characteristic difference of function. We must weigh our examples, and not treat them simply as counters.
Cf. Quine, p. 119: “The move that ushers in abstract singular terms has to be one that simultaneously ushers in abstract general ones.”
See Individuals, Ch. 5 et seq.
The variation in form from ‘pretty’ to ‘prettiness’ supplies the substantive which is grammatically typical for referential position; the insertion of ‘has’ before ‘prettiness’ yields a phrase which as a whole is grammatically suitable for predicative position, while containing a part, ‘prettiness’, grammatically suitable for referential position.
Not all particulars are spatio-temporally continuous as Betty is. But the contrast between principles of grouping is not in general dependent on such continuity, though it is seen most easily in cases characterized by continuity. The expression ‘The Plough’ (used as the name of a constellation) designates a spatio-temporal particular, though not a continuous one; whereas even if it should come to pass that all the gold in the universe formed one continuous mass, this would not turn ‘gold’ into the designation of a spatio-temporal particular. What makes it correct to count a star as a bit of the Plough or an arm as a bit of Betty has at least to do with their spatio-temporal relation to other bits of the Plough or of Betty in a way in which what makes it correct to count something as an instance of gold has nothing to do with its spatio-temporal relations to other instances of gold. The distinction between being a particular part of (or element in, etc.) and being a particular instance of remains bright enough here, even though spatial continuity is gone. Of course this is only the beginning of a long and complex story which perhaps has no very clear and definite end; for as we bring more sophisticated characters into our story, the clarity and the simplicity of the contrast between principles of grouping tend to diminish. But we are investigating foundations; and it is enough if the beginnings are clear and distinct.
But, of course, by adopting this terminology I by no means intend to suggest that the only differences that can properly be described as differences of type or category are the very broad differences I am concerned with. One may have occasion, for example, to distinguish many different types or categories within the very broad category of particulars.
The point can indeed be put, though less clearly, without reference to identification. Something a thing is is of a higher type than anything which is it; a thing which is something is of a lower type than anything it is. The italicized ‘is’ here corresponds to ‘is a case of’, though it differs from the latter phrase, of course, in permitting a grammatically adjectival termination.
The words ‘on the whole’ signify the need for certain reservations, or at least for further reflection, about some adverbial expressions like ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘now’, ‘then’. Quine says these can be ‘parsed’ as general terms. But no amount of parsing would seem to defend their position from occupation by ‘somewhere’, ‘somewhen’, etc.
The point is explained in Individuals. See especially p. 327.
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© 1969 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Strawson, P.F. (1969). Singular Terms and Predication. In: Davidson, D., Hintikka, J. (eds) Words and Objections. Synthese Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_8
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