Skip to main content

Water is Not H2O

  • Chapter
Philosophy Of Chemistry

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 242))

Conclusions

In this essay I have discussed an assumption of semantic externalist theories which I called the coordination principle. This is the idea that natural language kinds and scientific kinds line up or can be mapped onto one another one-to-one. A closer look at water shows that there is not this type of simple one-to-one match between chemical and ordinary language kinds. In fact, the use of kind terms in chemistry is often context sensitive and in cases where chemists want to ensure no ambiguity, they use a very complex and nuanced set of kind terms, none of which could be reasonably associated with the ordinary language kind term “water” alone. Since we cannot just turn to chemistry to find a single chemical kind that can be used to determine the extension of “water,” there is not any strict sense in which water is H2O, because exactly what water is depends on the context in which “water” is uttered.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. 1999. Language and Reality. Cambrdige, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dupré, J. 1993. The Disorder of Things. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, M. 1997. Manifest kinds. Journal of Philosophy 94: 564–583.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambrdige, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mellor, D. N. 1974. Natural kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28: 299–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Needham, P. 2000. What is water? Analysis 60: 13–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pauling, L. 1947. General Chemistry. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Collected Papers. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny, K. 1983. Natural kind terms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 110–125.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stroll, A. 1998. Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Weisberg, M. (2006). Water is Not H2O. In: Baird, D., Scerri, E., McIntyre, L. (eds) Philosophy Of Chemistry. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 242. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3261-7_18

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics