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Can a restrictive definition lead to biases and tautologies?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2007

Luc-Alain Giraldeau
Affiliation:
Département des Sciences Biologiques, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3P8, Canada; giraldeau.luc-alain@uqam.camorand-ferron.julie@uqam.ca
Louis Lefebvre
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, H3A 1B1, Canada. louis.lefebvre@mcgill.ca
Julie Morand-Ferron
Affiliation:
Département des Sciences Biologiques, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3P8, Canada; giraldeau.luc-alain@uqam.camorand-ferron.julie@uqam.ca

Abstract

We argue that the operational definition proposed by Ramsey et al. does not represent a significant improvement for students of innovation, because it is so restrictive that it might actually prevent the testing of hypotheses on the relationships between innovation, ecology, evolution, culture, and intelligence. To avoid tautological thinking, we need to use an operational definition that is taxonomically unbiased and neutral with respect to the hypotheses to be tested.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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