The case for a cognitive approach to animal learning and behavior

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Abstract

The dangers of hypothesizing about unobservable cognitive mechanisms are well known to behavior analysts. I propose, however, that carefully fashioned cognitive theories that make predictions that are inconsistent with current behavioral theories can provide useful research tools for the understanding of behavior. Furthermore, even if the results of such research may be accommodated by modifying existing behavioral theories, our understanding of behavior is often advanced by the empirical findings because it is unlikely that the research would have been conducted in the absence of such cognitive hypothesizing. Two examples of the development of emergent relations are described: The first deals with the nature of a pigeon's ‘representation’ of two stimuli both of which are associated with correct responding to a third in a many-to-one matching task (stimulus equivalence or common representations). The second has to do with transitive inference, the emergent relation between two stimuli mediated by their relation to a common stimulus in a simultaneous discrimination.

Section snippets

The case for a cognitive approach to animal learning and behavior

Two very different approaches to animal cognition have appeared during the 20th century. The first approach, characterized originally by the work of Romanes (1883), can be thought of as a biological approach because of its emphasis on the genetic basis of behavior. This approach has focused on the adaptive (survival) value of cognitive processes and posits that evolution has genetically selected animals for certain cognitive abilities. According to this view, cognitive behavior evolved

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant IBN 941489 and National Institute of Mental Health Grants 55118 and 59194. I thank Janice Weaver, Emily Klein, and Tricia Clement for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

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