Abstract
In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals.
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I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer.
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Bermúdez, J.L. Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal Ethics. J Ethics 11, 319–335 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-007-9013-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-007-9013-8